Search results for "Cost sharing"
showing 7 items of 7 documents
Positive density-dependent growth supports costs sharing hypothesis and population density sensing in a manipulative parasite.
2017
SUMMARYParasites manipulate their hosts’ phenotype to increase their own fitness. Like any evolutionary adaptation, parasitic manipulations should be costly. Though it is difficult to measure costs of the manipulation directly, they can be evaluated using an indirect approach. For instance, theory suggests that as the parasite infrapopulation grows, the investment of individual parasites in host manipulation decreases, because of cost sharing. Another assumption is that in environments where manipulation does not pay off for the parasite, it can decrease its investment in the manipulation to save resources. We experimentally infected rainbow trout Oncorhynchus mykiss with the immature larva…
The UN in the Lab
2013
We consider two alternatives to inaction for governments combating terrorism, which we term Deterrence and Prevention. Deterrence – investing in resources that reduce the impact of an attack – generates a negative externality to other governments, making their countries a more attractive objective for terrorists, while Prevention – investing in resources that reduce the ability of the terrorist organization to mount an attack – creates a positive externality by reducing the overall threat of terrorism for all. Due to the structure of this interaction, countries can benefit from coordination of policy choices, and international institutions (such as the UN) can be utilized to facilitate coor…
Cooperation among competitors: A comparison of cost-sharing mechanisms
2016
Abstract In this paper, we investigate the consequences of using outcome-based versus ex ante-based cost-sharing mechanisms in terms of competing firms' profitability and total welfare. We consider two firms making a joint expenditure, which can positively affect firms' demand and/or unit operating costs, while competing in the final market by setting either price or quantity. We compare two outcome-based cost-sharing mechanisms, i.e., Quantity Proportional (QP) and Total Margin proportional (TM), with the more competitive Fixed Share (FS) mechanism where cost-sharing is set up on an ex ante basis. We show that outcome-based mechanisms, and even a fully collusive behavior induced by the opt…
Generic Advertising, Brand Advertising and Price Competition: An Analysis of Free-Riding Effects and Coordination Mechanisms
2010
The main purpose of generic advertising is to enlarge the total market demand rather than capturing further slices from competitors. Several studies point out emergence of free-riding behavior under independent contribution and suggest use of coordination mechanism. However, existing literature does not shed light on the conditions under which generic advertising can be detrimental (beneficial) to stronger firms weakening (strengthening) their competitive advantage. Also, under a setting including both price and brand advertising competition, coordination in generic advertising has not been unraveled. In order to deal with such issues, we consider a one-stage duopoly game in which two firms…
Prices in Mixed Cost Allocation Problems
2001
Abstract We consider mixed cost allocation problems, i.e., joint cost problems that involve two types of heterogeneous outputs, divisible and indivisible. The Aumann–Shapley price mechanism is extended to this setting. We also present a set of properties which characterize this cost sharing rule. Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: D63, C79.
Strategic behavior and partial cost sharing
2003
Abstract The main objects here are games in which players mainly compete but nonetheless collaborate on some subsidiary activities. Play assumes a two-stage nature in that first-stage moves presume coordination of some subsequent tasks. Specifically, we consider instances where second-stage coordination amounts to partial cost sharing, anticipated and sustained as a core solution. Examples include regional Cournot oligopolies with joint transportation. We define and characterize equilibria, and inquire about their existence.
The Serial Property and Restricted Balanced Contributions in discrete cost sharing problems
2006
We show that the Serial Poperty and Restricted Balanced Contributions characterize the subsidy-free serial cost sharing method (Moulin (1995)) in discrete cost allocation problems.